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Abstract
We take advantage of a natural experiment in the minimum wage setting in Russia
to study the employment consequences of large hikes in the minimum wage. In
September 2007, the Russian government raised the federal minimum wage from
1100 to 2300 Rubles and simultaneously gave the regions the power to set their
own minima above the federal threshold. In studying the effect of this reform, we
follow the approach proposed by David Card and compare changes in employment
rates and other labor market outcomes before and after the hike across regions with
different shares of affected workers. We find some evidence of adverse effects of the
2007 hike in the minimum wage on employment. They are mostly visible in lower
employment rates among the youth, as well as the increased informalization of
employment.
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1 Introduction
The minimum wage is one of the most controversial issues in labor economics, eco-
nomic policy, and politics. A typical purpose of minimum wage policies is to support
low-wage workers and thereby fight inequality and poverty (Belser and Rani 2015).
Less frequently, minimum wage policies are advocated as a means to correct imperfec-
tions in the labor market, regarding employers’ monopsony power in particular (e.g.,
Boal and Ransom 1997). However, the effectiveness of the minimum wage in achieving
these goals is highly contested. From the theoretical viewpoint, the standard labor sup-
ply and demand model suggests that the minimum wage may increase unemployment,
especially among low-skilled workers (Stigler 1946). There are also concerns that the
minimum wage promotes informalization of the labor market, which is particularly
relevant in the developing world. Moreover, the benefits of the minimum wage in mo-
nopsonistic environments have been questioned in a number of recent contributions,
such as Danziger (2010).
The empirical evidence regarding the employment effects of the minimum wage re-
mains contradictory and inconclusive. For example, the seminal symposium published
in the Industrial and Labor Relations Review (ILLR) in 1992 provided highly conflicting
results regarding this issue. The estimated effect of the minimum wage on the employ-
ment of less-skilled workers ranged from negative (Neumark and Wascher 1992) and
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zero (Card 1992) to positive (Katz and Krueger 1992). This controversy continues to
date. For example, Dube et al. (2010) find no disemployment effects in restaurants and
other low-wage sectors in the USA, Dolton et al. (2012) report no or a small positive
impact of the minimum wage on employment in the UK, while Sen et al. (2011) find
significant disemployment effects among teens in Canada. As the most comprehensive
survey of the literature up to 2006, the review study by Neumark and Wascher (2008)
concludes that the minimum wage has a negative effect on the employment opportun-
ities of less-skilled workers and no effect on overall employment. However, Belman and
Wolfson (2014, p. 15) point out that the estimated effects of the minimum wage “are
either statistically nonsignificant or are too small in magnitude to be economically
meaningful”.
Most empirical papers in this field commonly focus on relatively small increases in
the nominal minimum wage, typically below 20 %. For instance, in the USA, the magni-
tude of the federal minimum wage hikes examined in empirical studies—including
those published in the 1992 special issue of ILLR—did not exceed 30 %. Similarly, each
of the regular increases in the UK minimum wage between 1999 and 2007 did not
exceed 15 % (Dolton et al. 2012). It is plausible that the absence of robust evidence re-
garding the employment effects of the minimum wage stems from this particular fea-
ture of the empirical literature. Indeed, from the theoretical viewpoint, employers’
adjustment costs may deter them from laying off low-wage workers in response to a
small increase in the minimum wage. From the estimation perspective, small variation
in the minimum wage can complicate econometric identification, especially when mini-
mum wage hikes are regular and expected or when there are measurement errors in
the data.
In this paper, we present new evidence on the employment effects of a large increase
in the minimum wage. We take advantage of a natural experiment that occurred in
Russia in September 2007 when a comprehensive reform of the minimum wage setting
was introduced. Firstly, the federal minimum wage was sharply raised from 1100 to
2300 Rubles.1 Secondly, the minimum wage setting was decentralized with regions re-
ceiving the right to set their own regional minima above the federal floor. Some regions
made use of this opportunity instantaneously, whereby the minimum wage in these re-
gions increased by much more than the 109 % implied by the federal law. With over 80
regions being characterized by very diverse economic conditions—including employ-
ment and wages—and abrupt changes in its economic policy, Russia provides a very
good laboratory for studying the economic consequences of the minimum wage.
To estimate the impact of the 2007 increase in the minimum wage on employment,
we rely on the methodological approach proposed by Card (1992). It is based on com-
paring labor market outcomes before and after the minimum wage change across re-
gions with different fractions of affected workers (namely, workers earning between the
old and new minimum wages). This approach has found many applications in the em-
pirical literature, both in the USA (e.g., Card and Krueger 1995; Wessels 2007) and
internationally (e.g., Bazen and Skourias 1997 for France and Stewart 2002 for the UK).
The main strength of this paper is the use—for identification purposes—of the unique
data with extremely large variation in the minimum wage as well as labor market out-
comes across 85 regions of Russia. Our study is among the first to exploit this quasi-
experimental setting—and the 2007 reform in particular—in analyzing the labor market
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effects of the minimum wage.2 Another strength of the paper is its focus on a broad
range of labor market outcomes, including not only employment and unemployment
rates among various sub-groups in the population but also informal employment. We
argue that data from post-transitional Russia—a country that combines essential fea-
tures of developed and developing economies—are particularly well suited for studying
the effect of the minimum wage on such multiple outcomes.
The main results of the paper can be summarized as follows. We find some evidence
of adverse effects of the minimum wage on employment. Specifically, the 2007
minimum wage hike was associated with a decrease in youth employment and
increased informality. The result is largely driven by regions that introduced their own
minimum wages above the federal floor. We attribute the latter to the larger magnitude
of the minimum wage hikes in these regions compared to those that simply adopted
the federal minimum wage. Another possibility is that the regional increases in the
minimum wage were less anticipated than the federal one, whereby it was impossible
for employers to adjust to them in advance. Importantly, the results are in line with the
findings in Muravyev and Oshchepkov (2013), which adopts the region panel data
approach (e.g., Neumark and Wascher 1992) to studying the effect of the minimum
wage on employment in Russia.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the institu-
tional background of the minimum wage setting in Russia. Section 3 outlines the meth-
odology of our empirical analysis. Section 4 describes the data, before Section 5
presents and discusses the empirical results. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Institutional background
This section offers only a brief summary of the institutional background regarding the
minimum wage setting in Russia, given that the details can be found in previous stud-
ies, particularly Muravyev and Oshchepkov (2013) and Lukiyanova and Vishnevskaya
(2015). The minimum wage in Russia already existed during the central planning era,
in the form of the lowest monthly wage in the wage grid. However, the term minimum
wage was not used at that time. It only appeared in national law after the start of the
country’s transition to a market economy.3 Since the early 1990s, the minimum wage
has been defined as the minimum pay per month of full-time employment (typically
40 h per week). Until 2007, the minimum wage was determined at the federal
level. The federal minimum applied to all groups of workers without any
differences by age, occupation, or industry. It was set at the same level across re-
gions, with the exception of those in the North and Far East, where the so-called
Northern wage multipliers applied.4
In the mid-1980s, the ratio of the minimum to average wage (the Kaitz ratio)
amounted to about 35–40 %, which is a typical level for OECD countries. In the
1990s—a period of economic reforms accompanied by hyperinflation—there was a dra-
matic erosion of the real minimum wage in Russia, despite regular minimum wage
hikes. As a result, by the start of the new century, the minimum wage amounted to a
mere 6 % of the average wage. A number of more substantial increases were introduced
between 2001 and 2007, although given the double-digit inflation in the country, they
only helped to keep the Kaitz ratio at about 10 % (Muravyev and Oshchepkov 2013).
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This changed in September 2007, when a comprehensive reform of the minimum
wage was introduced. First, the nominal minimum wage was raised by 109 %. Second,
the minimum wage setting was decentralized. Since September 2007, Russia’s regions
have the right to define their own regional minima (which may be sector-specific)
above the federal threshold. Third, the 2007 reform of the minimum wage setting elimi-
nated the link between the minimum wage and the Northern multiplier, previously set
in federal law.
As a result of the reform, the nominal minimum wage more than doubled and the
Kaitz ratio exceeded 20 % nationwide. The “fraction affected”—namely the share of
workers with wages above the old minimum wage but below the new minimum
wage—approached 6 %. Moreover, as many regions opted for own regional minima
above the federal threshold, considerable variation in the nominal minimum wage
across the regions emerged. Importantly, due to the very diverse levels of wages across
the country’s regions, the cross-regional variation in terms of the Kaitz ratio was even
more dramatic. For example, Muravyev and Oshchepkov (2013) report the Kaitz index
range between 8 and 46 % in September 2007. Similarly, the fraction affected varied
from almost zero in rich regions to double-digit numbers in less developed ones. In
sum, the reform generated considerable variation in the nominal minimum wage as
well as in the Kaitz index and the fraction affected.
3 Methodology
In order to estimate the impact of the 2007 hike in the minimum wage on employment,
we rely on the methodological approach first proposed by David Card (1992). In his
study, Card analyzed the impact on teenage employment of the 1990 increase in the
minimum wage in the USA, from $3.35 to $3.80. The general idea behind his approach
may be summarized as follows: “A rise in the federal minimum wage will typically
affect a larger fraction of workers in some states than in others. This variation provides
a simple natural experiment for measuring the effect of legislated wage floors, with a
“treatment effect” that varies across states depending on the fraction of workers initially
earning less than the new minimum” (Card 1992, p. 22). Formally, the approach leads
to estimating the following equation in the cross section of regions or states:
ΔEmploymenti ¼ α þ β  Fraction affectedi þ γ  Controlsi þ εi ð1Þ
where ΔEmploymenti is the difference in average employment rates before and after
the hike in the minimum wage in region i; Fraction_affectedi is the proportion of
workers who earn wages between the old and new minimum wages; Controlsi is a list
of control variables; and ɛi is a conventional error term. A negative and statistically sig-
nificant coefficient on variable Fraction_affectedi would imply disemployment effects of
the minimum wage.5
Equation (1) is the baseline econometric model in our analysis. We estimate it by
OLS allowing for heteroscedastic standard errors (using the Huber/White/sandwich es-
timator of variance). In addition, we consider several extensions of Eq. (1) and estimate
the model using various sub-samples of the data.
First, we attempt to control for the heterogeneity across the regions, which has be-
come a primary focus in the empirical literature (e.g., Allegretto et al. 2013). With this
purpose, we include controls measuring the trend in the dependent variables before the
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reform (as in Card 1992), the change in industrial production over 1 year preceding the
reform, and the share of rural population in the regions.
Second, we distinguish between the federal and regional minimum wage hikes (see
Wessels 2007; Bazen and Le Gallo 2009). In particular, we conduct analyses separately
for the regions that simply adopted the new federal threshold for the minimum wage
(regions with the federal minimum) and those that opted for higher wage floors
(regions with own minima). We argue that these two groups differ not only in the mag-
nitude of the minimum wage hikes (the regional minima are by definition larger, and
often much larger, than the federal minimum) but also in employers’ ability to antici-
pate (and hence, adjust in advance to) the new wage floors. In particular, while the fed-
eral hikes were regular and more-or-less expected by employers throughout the 2000s,
the institution of the regional minimum wages was first introduced in the federal law N
54-FZ passed on April 20, 2007. Regional hikes in the minimum wage adopted between
April 2007 and the fall of 2007 are likely to have been much more unexpected among
employers than any of the federal hikes in the 2000s.
Third, we exclude regions where the Northern wage multipliers applied. This robust-
ness check is motivated by the fact that these regions have a particular structure of the
economy, with high shares of extracting industries, high wages, and low unemploy-
ment. More importantly, the increase in the federal minimum wage in 2007 was ac-
companied by eliminating the Northern wage multipliers (which were used to inflate
the old federal minimum), whereby the fraction affected in these regions is rather low
and contributes little to econometric identification.
Next, we check whether our key results are sensitive to introducing weights that cap-
ture different sizes of Russian regions in terms of population. The use of such weights
has been a common robustness check in many prior studies of the minimum wage at
the level of regions or industries (see Krueger 1995; Bazen and Skourias 1997; Baker et
al. 1999 as well as Wessels 2007). In our case, the main motivation comes from the fact
that Russia has a number of small regions with a very peculiar economic structure (e.g.,
economies centered on a particular industry), which often become outliers in empirical
analyses. In addition, the use of weights helps to estimate the effect of the minimum
wage on the economy at large.6
We also re-estimate the regressions using the dependent variable measured not as a
difference in employment rates but rather as a difference in their logs, similarly to
Wessels (2007). Finally, following Stewart (2002), we run a placebo test in which we
use the dependent variable lagged by 1 year (change in employment between November
2006 and November 2005) and the fraction affected by the 2007 reform.
4 Data
The data for this study come from several sources. The first source is the Labor Force
Survey (LFS) administered by the Russian Statistical Agency (Rosstat). The survey is a
repeated cross section conducted on a quarterly basis (in February, May, August, and
November). The data contain information on employment in each of Russia’s regions,
including various demographic groups (in particular, the youth, women, and low-
educated workers).7 The LFS covers all regions of Russia and contains several hundred
thousand observations. Importantly, the survey is representative at the regional level.
From the viewpoint of this paper, one of the main strengths of the Russian LFS is the
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ability to differentiate between formal and informal employment.8 One of its main
weaknesses is the absence of wage data, given that respondents are not asked questions
on wages to minimize survey non-response.
With these data at hand, we are able to compute the following dependent variables
measuring labor market outcomes in Russian regions on a quarterly basis:
 Employment rate (EMPLOY), defined as the number of employed people aged 15
to 72 divided by the total population aged 15 to 72.
 Formal employment rate (FORMAL), defined as the number of people (aged 15 to
72) employed in the formal sector divided by the total population aged 15 to 72.
 Informal employment rate (INFORM), defined as the ratio of the number of people
(aged 15 to 72) employed in the informal sector to the total population, for people
aged 15 to 72.
 Unemployment rate (UNEMPL), defined as the number of unemployed divided by
the economically active population, for people aged 15 to 72. As is standard in
labor market statistics, the economically active population comprises employed and
unemployed people.
 Youth employment rate (YOUT_E), same as the general employment rate but
computed for people aged 15 to 24.
 Youth unemployment rate (YOUT_U), same as the general unemployment rate but
computed for those aged 15 to 24.
 Female employment rate (FEM_E), defined as the number of employed women
aged 15 to 72 divided by the total number of women aged 15 to 72.
 Female unemployment (FEM_U), defined as the number of unemployed women aged
25 to 72 divided by the number of economically active women in the same age bracket.
 Employment rate among low-educated workers (LOW_E), defined as the number
of employed people who have basic or general secondary education among the total
population aged 15 to 72.9
 Unemployment rate among low-educated workers (LOW_U), defined as the num-
ber of unemployed people who have basic or general secondary education among
the economically active population with basic or general secondary education, for
the age bracket 15 to 72.
We supplement these data with information on regional minimum wages obtained
from databases of national and regional laws, such as Consultant Plus,10 as well as web
sites of regional governments and other internet sources.
Next, we add data on the distribution of monthly wages across the Russian regions
prior to the 2007 minimum wage reform. These data are collected by Rosstat from a
detailed survey of employers conducted on an annual basis in April (henceforth, the
April survey of employers). To date, this is the only survey that provides detailed wage
data, particularly regarding the percentage of workers whose wages lie within a specific
bracket, for all regions of the country. We use the data from the 2007 wave of the sur-
vey, as the closest to the minimum wage hike in September 2007. With this informa-
tion at hand, we are able to compute the key independent variable in our regression
analysis, fraction affected. Note that due to the small number of brackets, we have to
resort to linear interpolation.11
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The main strength of the April survey of employers is its large scale (over 90,000 or-
ganizations in all major industries and of all ownership types) and nationwide coverage.
However, there are also two important limitations: the survey excludes small businesses
yet includes wages of part-time workers. The former implies an underestimation of the
fraction affected (small firms—which are omitted from the survey—typically pay lower
wages compared to large firms) while the latter leads to an overestimation of the frac-
tion affected (a worker may have a monthly wage below the new minimum wage due
to engaging in part-time employment). We assess the importance of these limitations
for our estimation results using additional control variables that capture at the regional
level (a) the share of workers employed in small businesses in 2006 and (b) the share of
part-time workers in 2006. These additional data are taken from Rosstat.
Finally, we supplement all these data with information on the dynamics of output
(change in industrial production) and shares of urban vs. rural population, which are
also taken from the official publications by Rosstat.
The descriptive statistics of the data are shown in Table 1. The average fraction af-
fected amounts to almost 6.46 % for the federal increase in the minimum wage. Once
the regional hikes are taken into account, the respective number rises to 8.15 %. The
huge variation across the regions in the fraction affected is notable, ranging from 0.05
to 20.16 % for the federal hike and from 0.05 to 28.06 % for the regional ones. The data
also show considerable variation in labor market outcomes across regions; for example,
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of key variables
Variable Mean Median Min Max SD
Fraction affected (federal) 6.46 6.25 0.05 20.16 4.37
Fraction affected 8.15 7.59 0.05 28.06 5.59
Kaitz index (federal) 21.60 22.08 6.13 45.44 7.14
Kaitz index 24.18 24.26 6.13 47.45 8.44
EMPLOY 62.27 62.68 29.64 76.79 6.38
FORMAL 51.51 52.64 22.16 72.64 9.01
INFORM 10.69 10.68 2.03 22.77 4.31
UNEMPL 7.06 6.17 0.79 32.33 4.45
YOUT_E 34.51 34.96 13.83 48.80 6.62
YOUT_U 14.82 13.11 3.47 61.22 8.97
FEM_E 58.59 58.24 21.05 75.61 6.82
FEM_U 6.63 5.72 0.70 38.29 4.66
LOW_E 42.79 42.70 21.56 62.77 6.37
LOW_U 10.94 9.48 2.52 31.44 6.02
Ind. production index 109.95 109.35 72.60 159.00 15.62
Share of rural population 32.38 31.40 0.00 100.00 15.73
Share of workers in small firms 7.32 6.81 0.66 26.41 3.97
Share of part-time workers 5.78 4.76 0.15 31.06 4.37
Population, thousands 1631.00 1171.50 18.00 10443.00 1610.94
Notes: All variables except population are measured in percentages. Fraction affected is the percentage of workers who
earn wages between the old and new minimum wages, based on the distribution of wages in April 2007. Kaitz index is
the ratio of the minimum wage and the average wage in the region, measured in November 2007. Ind. production index
is the index of industrial production between the third quarter of 2006 and the third quarter of 2007. Share of workers in
small firms is computed as the share of workers employed by small businesses divided by the working-age population;
the data are from 2006. Labor market outcomes (variables EMPLOY-LOW_U) are measured in November 2007
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the employment rate varies from 30 to 77 % (the average is 62 %) and the unemploy-
ment rate varies from 1 to 32 % (the average is 7 %).
As the constructed variable fraction affected has not been used in prior re-
search on the minimum wage in Russia, it may require additional validation. One
way of doing so is to compare it with another common measure of the signifi-
cance of the minimum wage, the Kaitz index. In contrast to the fraction affected
variable, the Kaitz index has been used in several papers on Russia, including
Kobzar (2009) and Muravyev and Oshchepkov (2013).12 Figures 1 and 2 plot frac-
tion affected and Kaitz index against each other. Figure 1 represents the case of
the federal minimum, while Fig. 2 also accounts for the regional minima. The
two measures—fraction affected and Kaitz index—prove to be closely related
regardless of whether we consider the federal or regional level. The correlation
coefficients exceed 90 %, thus suggesting that the fraction affected variable indeed
captures regional variation that is useful in identifying the effect of the 2007
minimum wage hike.
It may be of interest to compare the pre-reform characteristics of the regions that in-
troduced their own regional minima with those that did not do so by the fourth quarter
of 2007. The results are shown in Table 2. In the regions that did not introduce own
minimum wages, the fraction affected is equal to 7.03 %. The regions that opted for
higher regional minimum wages saw a considerably higher fraction affected, at an aver-
age level of 12.63 %. Had they opted for the federal minimum wage instead, the fraction
affected was a mere 4.18 %. Thus, the regional hikes provide an important source of
variation in the data.
There are also sizable differences in labor market outcomes across the two
groups of regions. For example, the employment rate is 3.11 % higher in the re-
gions that opted for own minimum wages. Similarly, the unemployment rate is
3.02 % lower in these regions compared with those that followed the federal
minimum wage. The data suggest that own minima were introduced by the re-
gions that performed on average better than the others.13 However, many of the
differences across the two groups of regions are statistically insignificant despite
possibly being economically large. This hints at the considerable heterogeneity
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Fig. 1 Fraction affected and Kaitz index plotted against each other, the federal minimum wage
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While interesting and informative, the above comparison between the two
groups of regions does not eliminate concerns about the potential endogeneity of
the regional minimum wages, which may lead to biased estimates. Lukiyanova
and Vishnevskaya (2015) provide some evidence against the endogeneity concern,
suggesting that economic considerations were not the main driving force behind
the regional governments’ decisions to introduce regional minimum wages.
However, this evidence is by no means conclusive. Given our lack of reliable data
to address the endogeneity issue in a rigorous way, we leave it for further
research.
5 Results and discussion
The main results of our empirical analysis are shown in Tables 3, 4, and 5. The tables
provide estimation results for the ten dependent variables chosen, namely employment
rate EMPLOY, formal employment rate FORMAL, informal employment rate IN-
FORM, general unemployment rate UNEMPL, youth employment rate YOUT_E, youth
unemployment rate YOUT_U, female employment rate FEM_E, female unemployment
rate FEM_U, employment rate among low-educated workers LOW_E, and unemploy-
ment rate among low-educated workers LOW_U. Table 3 contains the results for the
most parsimonious specification without any control variables. Table 4 shows the re-
gressions in which the only control variable is a lagged dependent variable (capturing
the trend in the dependent variable between November 2005 and November 2006).
Table 5 provides estimates for the regressions with additional controls, namely the
change in industrial production 1 year before the reform of the minimum wage as well
as the share of rural population. The results in Tables 3, 4, and 5 are arranged in the
following way: we start with the regressions for all the regions (panel A) then repeat
the analysis for the regions that simply adopted the federal minimum wage (panel B),
before focusing on the regions that introduced their own minima above the federal
floor (panel C). Subsequently, we drop the Northern regions from the sample (panel D)
and finally repeat the regressions for all the regions using their population as weights
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Fig. 2 Fraction affected and Kaitz index plotted against each other, accounting for the regional minimum wage
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We start with the results in Table 3. The regressions in panel A show statistically in-
significant results for all the regions. While most coefficients have signs consistent with
the presence of adverse effects of the minimum wage and some even have t-statistics
greater than one (in the regressions with informal employment rate and female
employment rate as the dependent variable), none are statistically significant at
the conventional levels. The test for the difference in the key coefficient in col-
umns 2 and 3—which is reported beneath the main estimation results in panel
A—suggests no differential effects of the minimum wage on formal and informal
employment (p value = 0.22).
The results of estimating the model using the sub-sample of the regions that
simply followed the federal minimum wage (panel B) also show statistically insig-
nificant results, with all t-statistics being substantially smaller than one. As in the
above case, there is no statistically significant difference in the coefficients on the
fraction affected variable in the regressions with formal and informal employment
(p value = 0.89).
By contrast, panel C shows several statistically significant coefficients estimated on
the sub-sample of the regions that raised the minimum wage above the federal floor. In
particular, the results suggest that the minimum wage hike reduced the formal employ-
ment rate and increased informal employment, as well as reduced the youth employ-
ment rate and increased youth unemployment. The test for the same effect of the
minimum wage hike on formal and informal employment is rejected at the 5 % level
(p value = 0.011). Since the coefficient on the overall employment rate is statistically
insignificant, there is apparently a move of workers from the formal sector to the
Table 2 Comparison of the pre-reform characteristics across the two groups of regions
Variable Regions with federal
minimum wage, N = 68
Regions with own
minimum wage, N = 17
Difference p value
Fraction affected 7.03 12.63 −5.60 0.00
Kaitz index 13.28 11.96 1.33 0.18
EMPLOY 60.46 63.56 −3.11 0.10
FORMAL 49.77 53.36 −3.58 0.15
INFORM 10.67 10.21 0.47 0.66
UNEMPL 8.48 5.46 3.02 0.07
YOUT_E 32.16 33.33 −1.17 0.55
YOUT_U 16.97 12.63 4.34 0.08
FEM_E 56.86 59.78 −2.92 0.13
FEM_U 8.11 4.95 3.16 0.08
LOW_E 41.97 44.37 −2.41 0.14
LOW_U 12.56 8.65 3.91 0.07
Ind. production index 108.12 108.34 −0.22 0.96
Share of rural population 34.46 24.10 10.36 0.01
Share of workers in small firms 6.66 9.95 3.29 0.00
Share of part-time workers 6.09 4.91 1.18 0.33
Population, thousands 1522.74 2340.71 −817.97 0.06
Notes: Fraction affected is based on regional minimum wages and wage data from April 2007. Labor market outcomes
(variables EMPLOY-LOW_U) as well as Kaitz index are measured in November 2006. Ind. production index is the index of
industrial production between the third quarter of 2005 and the third quarter of 2006. The other variables are measured
as of 2006
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informal one owing to the minimum wage hike. Furthermore, the coefficient on female
employment rate is negative and large in absolute value, although it fails to achieve
statistical significance at conventional levels. Note that the lack of significance may
stem from the paucity of the degrees of freedom, given that the regressions are esti-
mated on 17 observations only. Overall, these results are consistent with adverse effects
of the minimum wage hike on employment, including the substitution of informal for
formal employment.
When we estimate the regressions on the sub-sample that excludes the regions in the
North (panel D), we find two statistically significant coefficients. The hike in the
minimum wage appears to have reduced youth employment and increased youth un-
employment. The test for the difference in the key coefficient in columns 2 and 3 does
not reject the null (p value = 0.74).
Table 3 Regression results for the most parsimonious specification without control variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
EMPLOY FORMAL INFORM UNEMPL YOUT_E YOUT_U FEM_E FEM_U LOW_E LOW_U
Panel A: all regions, N = 85
Fraction
affected
0.000 −0.050 0.049 −0.010 −0.088 0.069 −0.062 −0.003 0.025 −0.021
(0.052) (0.057) (0.038) (0.043) (0.100) (0.113) (0.052) (0.046) (0.089) (0.070)
R2 0.000 0.005 0.015 0.000 0.012 0.004 0.010 0.000 0.001 0.000
H0: fraction affected[FORMAL] = fraction affected[INFORM], p value = 0.224
Panel B: regions with federal minimum wage, N = 68
Fraction
affected
0.057 0.015 0.037 −0.076 0.006 −0.133 −0.029 −0.058 0.003 −0.083
(0.089) (0.107) (0.070) (0.088) (0.147) (0.184) (0.096) (0.094) (0.145) (0.146)
R2 0.006 0.000 0.005 0.010 0.000 0.008 0.001 0.005 0.000 0.004
H0: fraction affected[FORMAL] = fraction affected[INFORM], p value = 0.887
Panel C: regions with own minimum wage, N = 17
Fraction
affected
−0.097 −0.203** 0.106* 0.003 −0.291* 0.295** −0.121 −0.027 −0.043 0.007
(0.075) (0.088) (0.054) (0.029) (0.153) (0.133) (0.072) (0.045) (0.125) (0.065)
R2 0.122 0.215 0.115 0.001 0.212 0.209 0.155 0.021 0.008 0.000
H0: fraction affected[FORMAL] = fraction affected[INFORM], p value = 0.011
Panel D: Northern regions are dropped, N = 60
Fraction
affected
0.022 −0.005 0.024 0.031 −0.161* 0.181* 0.004 0.029 0.030 0.050
(0.049) (0.057) (0.041) (0.040) (0.090) (0.094) (0.049) (0.046) (0.076) (0.075)
R2 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.047 0.023 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.002
H0: fraction affected[FORMAL] = fraction affected[INFORM], p value = 0.736
Panel E: regressions with weights, N = 85
Fraction
affected
−0.021 −0.082* 0.063* 0.010 −0.153* 0.095 −0.073 0.023 0.045 −0.025
(0.044) (0.047) (0.036) (0.033) (0.080) (0.092) (0.048) (0.033) (0.072) (0.061)
R2 0.003 0.030 0.040 0.001 0.068 0.014 0.026 0.003 0.006 0.001
H0: fraction affected[FORMAL] = fraction affected[INFORM], p value = 0.039
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
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Table 4 Regression results for the specification with lagged dependent variable as control variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
EMPLOY FORMAL INFORM UNEMPL YOUT_E YOUT_U FEM_E FEM_U LOW_E LOW_U
Panel A: all regions, N = 85
Fraction affected −0.005 −0.035 0.041 −0.003 −0.051 0.064 −0.057 −0.001 −0.003 −0.006
(0.044) (0.058) (0.039) (0.040) (0.088) (0.094) (0.046) (0.045) (0.073) (0.067)
R2 0.124 0.227 0.089 0.074 0.224 0.197 0.101 0.012 0.168 0.032
H0: fraction affected[FORMAL] = fraction affected[INFORM],
p value = 0.379
Panel B: regions with federal minimum wage, N = 68
Fraction affected 0.054 0.057 0.022 −0.049 0.024 −0.084 0.006 −0.053 −0.024 −0.053
(0.075) (0.097) (0.069) (0.090) (0.131) (0.160) (0.097) (0.095) (0.124) (0.147)
R2 0.165 0.249 0.076 0.074 0.226 0.203 0.117 0.014 0.165 0.028
H0: fraction affected[FORMAL] = fraction affected[INFORM],
p value = 0.811
Panel C: regions with own minimum wage, N = 17
Fraction affected −0.108** −0.195* 0.076 −0.003 −0.226 0.233 −0.130** −0.035 −0.157 0.004
(0.048) (0.099) (0.065) (0.028) (0.149) (0.140) (0.045) (0.044) (0.112) (0.071)
R2 0.136 0.278 0.162 0.185 0.348 0.261 0.162 0.215 0.387 0.173
H0: fraction affected[FORMAL] = fraction affected[INFORM],
p value = 0.040
Panel D: Northern regions are dropped, N = 60
Fraction affected 0.014 −0.017 0.016 0.036 −0.131 0.186** −0.001 0.029 0.003 0.083
(0.048) (0.059) (0.041) (0.037) (0.085) (0.090) (0.046) (0.045) (0.068) (0.062)
R2 0.037 0.305 0.145 0.018 0.171 0.144 0.025 0.002 0.102 0.019
H0: fraction affected[FORMAL] = fraction affected[INFORM],


















Table 4 Regression results for the specification with lagged dependent variable as control variables (Continued)
Panel E: regressions with weights, N = 85
Fraction affected −0.021 −0.077 0.062* 0.012 −0.143** 0.082 −0.066* 0.020 −0.003 −0.006
(0.038) (0.054) (0.035) (0.030) (0.069) (0.082) (0.039) (0.031) (0.056) (0.052)
R2 0.164 0.075 0.042 0.125 0.249 0.236 0.221 0.061 0.248 0.108
H0: fraction affected[FORMAL] = fraction affected[INFORM], p value = 0.071
Note: The coefficients on the control variables are not shown. Standard errors are in parentheses


















Finally, panel E shows the results for the regression with weights. There are three sta-
tistically significant coefficients, in the regressions with formal employment, informal
employment, and youth employment. The signs of these coefficients are consistent with
adverse effects of the minimum wage on employment. There is also a statistically sig-
nificant difference in the coefficients on the fraction affected variable in the regressions
with formal and informal employment (p value = 0.04).
Next, we switch to the results shown in Table 4. Similar to Table 3, we have no statis-
tically significant results in panel A of Table 4. The same holds for the results in panel
B. While some coefficients are large, they fail to achieve statistical significance. The test
for the difference in the key coefficient in columns 2 and 3 does not reject the null in
both panels.
Table 5 Regression results for the specification with lagged dependent variable as well as change
in industrial production and share of rural population as controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
EMPLOY FORMAL INFORM UNEMPL YOUT_E YOUT_U FEM_E FEM_U LOW_E LOW_U
Panel A: all regions, N = 85
Fraction
affected
0.010 −0.011 0.032 0.014 −0.035 0.064 −0.050 0.026 0.031 0.005
(0.049) (0.062) (0.040) (0.048) (0.098) (0.105) (0.048) (0.053) (0.079) (0.074)
R2 0.177 0.280 0.115 0.141 0.228 0.215 0.148 0.094 0.186 0.076
H0: fraction affected[FORMAL] = fraction affected[INFORM], p value = 0.632
Panel B: regions with federal minimum wage, N = 68
Fraction
affected
0.059 0.070 0.026 0.015 0.073 −0.065 −0.031 0.042 0.018 0.014
(0.085) (0.129) (0.085) (0.109) (0.178) (0.194) (0.090) (0.124) (0.165) (0.165)
R2 0.239 0.312 0.109 0.152 0.232 0.214 0.176 0.098 0.195 0.120
H0: fraction affected[FORMAL] = fraction affected[INFORM], p value = 0.817
Panel C: regions with own minimum wage, N = 17
Fraction
affected
−0.095 −0.149 0.054 −0.005 −0.226 0.175 −0.100 −0.047 −0.139 0.016
(0.057) (0.092) (0.076) (0.035) (0.173) (0.106) (0.056) (0.050) (0.102) (0.072)
R2 0.164 0.362 0.215 0.210 0.350 0.316 0.306 0.254 0.445 0.475
H0: fraction affected[FORMAL] = fraction affected[INFORM], p value = 0.110
Panel D: Northern regions are dropped, N = 60
Fraction
affected
0.006 −0.018 0.022 0.072 −0.132 0.212* −0.005 0.072 0.010 0.116
(0.065) (0.075) (0.048) (0.051) (0.083) (0.121) (0.072) (0.054) (0.074) (0.079)
R2 0.089 0.328 0.155 0.135 0.203 0.166 0.094 0.120 0.105 0.107
H0: fraction affected[FORMAL] = fraction affected[INFORM], p value = 0.716
Panel E: regressions with weights, N = 85
Fraction
affected
−0.022 −0.084 0.061* 0.051* −0.140** 0.165** −0.062 0.060** −0.030 0.063
(0.039) (0.054) (0.035) (0.027) (0.062) (0.072) (0.042) (0.027) (0.063) (0.046)
R2 0.169 0.077 0.047 0.207 0.320 0.293 0.223 0.145 0.289 0.172
H0: fraction affected[FORMAL] = fraction affected[INFORM], p value = 0.055
Note: The coefficients on the control variables are not shown. Standard errors are in parentheses
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
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Panel C shows several statistically significant coefficients. The minimum wage re-
duces the general employment rate, formal employment rate, and female employ-
ment rate. The coefficients on both youth employment rate and employment rate
among the low educated are negative and large in absolute value but statistically
insignificant. The coefficient on youth unemployment rate is positive and large but
fails to achieve statistical significance. Importantly, there is a statistically significant
difference in the main coefficient of interest in the models with formal and infor-
mal employment (p value = 0.04).
Panel D shows the results from estimating the model on the sub-sample that ex-
cludes the regions in the North. There are only two coefficients that are economically
large, namely in the regressions with the youth unemployment and youth employment
rates. However, the latter is statistically insignificant. The null hypothesis on the equal-
ity of the coefficients in the models with formal and informal employment is not
rejected (p value = 0.71).
In panel E, there are three statistically significant coefficients indicating a positive ef-
fect of the minimum wage hike on informal employment and a negative effect on the
youth employment rate and female employment rate. The key coefficient in the model
with formal employment as the dependent variable is negative and large, although it
fails to achieve statistical significance. The formal test rejects the null hypothesis on the
equality of the coefficients on the fraction affected variable in the regressions with for-
mal and informal employment at the 10 % level (p value 0.07).
Table 5 shows the results of estimating the previous model (with a lagged dependent
variable) augmented with additional control variables, the change in industrial produc-
tion during the four quarters preceding the minimum wage reform, and the share of
rural population. The results are similar to those for the parsimonious model. A few
coefficients lose statistical significance while remaining economically large, especially in
panel C (the sub-sample of regions with own minimum wages). Apparently, the model
with two extra parameters cannot be estimated precisely based on 17 observations. The
test does not reject the null that the key coefficients in columns 2 and 3 of panel C are
the same (p value = 0.11). By contrast, panel E contains statistically significant coeffi-
cients on five variables, including the informal employment and the youth employment
and unemployment rates as well as the female unemployment rate. Moreover, the test
for the equality of the coefficients in columns 2 and 3 rejects the null at the 10 % level
(p value = 0.06).
We conducted a number of additional checks (not reported in this article). First, we
ran a placebo regression in which we replaced the data from November 2007 and
November 2006 with data from November 2006 and November 2005, respectively.14
The fraction affected variable was taken from April 2007. As could be expected, this
placebo test returned statistically insignificant coefficients (aside from a couple of
wrongly signed ones). In addition, we re-ran the regressions using the difference in logs
of the dependent variables, as in Wessels (2007). The results proved qualitatively simi-
lar to those discussed above. Next, we dropped the data from the Republic of Dagestan,
a clear outlier in the Northeastern corner in Figs. 1 and 2, whereby the results
remained qualitatively the same as reported in the main analysis. We also checked
whether the results could be affected by the limitations of the wage data used in the
study. In particular, we included two additional control variables in the model,
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capturing (a) the share of workers employed in small businesses and (b) the share of
part-time workers in each region in 2006, both independently and jointly. The main
results remained unchanged. Interestingly, adding the share of part-time workers to the
list of regressors amplified the negative effect of the minimum wage on female employ-
ment. This is consistent with part-time employment being particularly common among
women.
Our summary and interpretation of these findings is the following. Firstly, there is
some evidence suggesting adverse employment effects of the 2007 hike in the minimum
wage in Russia. In particular, the hike reduced the employment rate among young
workers and promoted informalization of employment. Secondly, the result is particu-
larly strong for the sub-sample of regions that introduced their own minimum wages.
We believe that this pattern stems from the larger magnitude of the minimum wage
hikes in these regions compared to those that simply followed the federal minimum.
Another possibility is that the regional increases in the minimum wage were less
strongly anticipated than the federal one, whereby employers could not adjust to them
in advance. Indeed, the federal hikes were regular and were usually introduced after
prolonged discussions among employers, trade unions, and government. By contrast,
regional minimum wages only became possible after April 20, 2007, following the
changes in the federal law N 54-FZ. To be effective by the start of the fourth quarter of
2007, the regional minima had to be introduced within a few months, thus likely being
unexpected among employers.
We admit that the results obtained in this study may be regarded as not very strong
and robust, especially against the background of a very large increase in the minimum
wage. There are several potential explanations for the relative weakness of the results.
First, with a cross section of 85 observations, it is virtually impossible to properly
account for the heterogeneity in labor market outcomes and their dynamics across the
regions. Consequently, the standard errors become too large and the coefficients on the
minimum wage variables fail to achieve statistical significance. Indeed, when we at-
tempt to reduce this heterogeneity (e.g., by excluding the Northern regions from the
sample), the results become stronger. Second, the less-than-perfect quality of the data
at hand may play a role. In particular, in constructing the fraction affected variable, we
have to rely on wage data from the April survey of employers, which is biased towards
larger and registered firms and does not exclude wages of part-time workers. Moreover,
wages in this survey are reported in rather wide brackets, which forces us to resort to
interpolation. If there is a sizable measurement error in the constructed variable—which
is not unlikely—the regression coefficients will suffer from attenuation bias. In this case,
our results should be viewed as a lower bound of the actual effect of the minimum wage
on employment. Finally, the results can be at least partly explained by imperfect
enforcement of the minimum wage. Indeed, poor enforcement implies that the
minimum wage may have little or no impact on labor market outcomes. And there
is substantial evidence that enforcement/compliance is not perfect in developing
and transition countries.15
Nevertheless, our analysis retrieves many statistically significant coefficients that are
consistent with adverse effects of minimum wage hikes on employment. Importantly,
none of the statistically significant coefficients suggests the opposite. Overall, there is
sufficient evidence to claim that large hikes in the minimum wage adversely affect
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employment—at least among certain groups of workers—as well as promote informali-
zation of the labor market in Russia.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we extend the international literature on the minimum wage using new
data from Russia. Similar to many other studies focusing on transition and post-
transition countries (e.g., Muravyev 2008; Gorodnichenko et al. 2009; Eicher and
Schreiber 2010), we take advantage of a unique institutional setting with frequent and
abrupt regulatory changes to address an important question of general interest for labor
economists. Specifically, we look at the employment consequences of the sharp increase
of the minimum wage from 1100 to 2300 Rubles in September 2007.
We find some evidence of adverse effects of the minimum wage on the labor market.
In particular, the hike in the minimum wage upon which we focus is associated with
increased youth unemployment and informality. This finding is consistent with many
previous studies for both developed and developing economies (Neumark and Wascher
2008; Nataraj et al. 2014). Importantly, it is in line with the results in Muravyev and
Oshchepkov (2013), which are obtained using the region panel data approach with
Russian data.
Overall, our analysis supports the viewpoint that the minimum wage may be a prob-
lematic policy instrument—including in terms of tackling poverty and inequality—given
that it increases unemployment among the youth and forces workers to take informal
jobs, which are typically associated with lower job security, lower earnings, and a lack
of social security protection.
Endnotes
1This hike is almost unprecedented among not only developed but also developing
countries. We are aware of only two increases in the minimum wage similar in magni-
tude to the 2007 hike in Russia: one took place in Hungary in 2001 (Kertesi and Kollo
2003) and the other one occurred in Indonesia in the 1990s (Rama 2001). However, in
both cases, the doubling of the minimum wage did not happen immediately. In the
former case, it occurred in two steps within 1 year, while in the latter case, it took
4 years.
2There are only a handful of studies of the minimum wage policies in Russia. The list
includes Kobzar (2009), Lukiyanova (2011), Muravyev and Oshchepkov (2013),
Lukiyanova and Vishnevskaya (2015), and Kapelyuk (2015). However, none of these
focus on the employment effects of the 2007 hike in the minimum wage.
3This can be seen as an integral part of the process of building previously
missing labor market institutions during the transition from plan to market, see,
e.g., Muravyev (2014).
4In the state-controlled economy of the USSR, workers living in the North and Far
East were entitled by law to higher wages, introduced via the Northern multiplier,
which varied from 1.15 to 2 depending on the severity of living conditions in the re-
spective territories. The government thus tried to emulate compensating wage differen-
tials that would have emerged in a market environment. While the privatization
process of the 1990s rendered this system no longer applicable to the wage setting in
most of the economy, it remained binding for the minimum wage in both private and
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public sectors until August 2007. The Northern multiplier thus implied a substantial
cross-regional variation in the nominal minimum wage in Russia.
5Computing the elasticity of employment with respect to the minimum wage re-
quires, in addition to Eq. (1), a second equation that relates wage growth to the fraction
affected (see Card 1992). We do not follow this route due to the lack of necessary data
on wages.
6Russia’s regions are very diverse in terms of size: while some of them have over five
million inhabitants, some others have fewer than 0.25 million people.
7These are not open-access data. Rosstat only provides free access to the averages of
some variables over four consecutive quarters. The detailed quarterly data were made
available to us through the Center for Labor Market Studies at the HSE Moscow. The
official link to the survey on the Rosstat web site: http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/
rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/publications/catalog/doc_1140097038766 as accessed
on September 15, 2015.
8Rosstat considers all workers whose job is not within a firm as being informal. An
important advantage of such a general definition of informality is that it is not sensitive
to mistakes and non-responses of respondents when questions about the size of the
firm, its official status (registered vs. unregistered), contributions to the social security
funds, etc. are asked. However, this advantage can also prove to be a deficiency. In par-
ticular, it is possible that the definition omits some other important manifestations of
informal employment, especially informal employment within the formal sector.
Nonetheless, the available evidence from Rosstat suggests that such employment only
constitutes about 1 % of all informal employment. Therefore, we believe that the
measure of informal employment available to us is reasonably accurate and captures
the most essential aspects of this phenomenon in Russia.
9We contrast basic and general secondary education with professional and higher
education.
10Web address: www.consultant.ru, as accessed on September 15, 2015.
11For example, the survey reports the percent of workers within the following wage
brackets: below 1100 Rubles, from 1100 to 1800 Rubles, from 1800 to 2600 Rubles,
from 2600 to 3400 Rubles, and so on. If the minimum wage changed from 1100 to
2300 Rubles (which was the case in most regions), we add up the percent of workers
within the second bracket (1100 to 1800 Rubles) and (2300 − 1800)/(2600 − 1800) =
0.625 times the percent of workers in the third bracket in order to obtain a measure of
the fraction affected. It is not obvious whether one should incorporate the percent of
workers from the first bracket (below 1100 Rubles, the old minimum wage) into the
fraction affected variable. In particular, the respective numbers can be regarded as a
measure of non-compliance with the old minimum wage. If employers did not comply
with the old minimum wage, they are likely to ignore the new minimum. In any case,
including this bracket (corresponding to 1.2 % of workers nationwide) does not change
our results in any substantial way.
12Similar to the mentioned papers, we compute the Kaitz index using data on average
wages from the total survey of employers, which includes small firms and is run by
Rosstat on a monthly basis. In contrast to the April survey of employers, this monthly
survey does not provide detailed information on the distribution of wages and thus, it
is not suitable for computing the fraction affected, the key variable in our analysis.
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13Interestingly, these findings are consistent with the evidence from the USA suggest-
ing that own minimum wages (higher than the federal level) tend to be introduced by
stronger regions and in economically favorable periods (Neumark et al. 2014; Baskaya
and Rubinstein 2012).
14Note that there was a hike of the minimum wage on May 1, 2006, from 800 to
1100 Rubles (or 38 %). The timing of the minimum wage changes in the mid-2000 was
such that it is impossible to find four quarters without a minimum wage hike.
15However, several studies suggest a limited role of this factor in Russia. Kapelyuk
(2015) analyzes the non-compliance of employers with minimum wage laws by check-
ing the share of full-time workers with wages lower than the minimum wage in the
RLMS, the best panel survey of Russian households. He finds that “non-compliance
was modest, indicating that there was strong enforcement of the minimum wage
agreements” (p. 403). Gimpelson et al. (2010), who study the enforcement of employ-
ment protection legislation in Russia, note that non-compliance with labor regulations
is higher in the Far East and the North of the country. However, these are high-wage
regions where the minimum wage bite is modest or even close zero.
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